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Case No. 20100860-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Mario Alberto Garcia, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals his sentence following a guilty plea to one count of 
attempted possession of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, and one 
count of DUI, a class A misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 
Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by ordering consecutive prison 
sentences, where Defendant has not shown that the trial court failed to consider any 
required factor? 
Standard of Review. "The trial court has substantial discretion in conducting 
sentencing hearings and imposing a sentence, and [this Court] will in general 
overturn the trial court's sentencing decisions only if [it] find[s] an abuse of 
discretion/' State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381,389 (Utah App. 1997) (citations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-401 (West 2004) is determinative of this appeal 
and is included as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THE CASE 
On July 7, 2007, Defendant was charged with one count of possessing a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine), one count of driving under the influence 
and causing bodily injury, one count of failing to stop at the scene of an 
injury/accident, one count of operating a vehicle without insurance, one count of 
possessing drug paraphernalia, one count of driving without a license, and one 
count of failing to stop at a red light. R. 1-3. As set forth in the accompanying 
probable cause statement, a witness saw Defendant drive a van through a red light 
and strike a car. R. 3-4. Two victims were injured in the collision: one was 
transported to a hospital with neck injuries, and the other, who had to be "extricated 
from the vehicle/7 was flown to a hospital with a broken pelvis. R. 3-4. When 
Defendant was apprehended a short time later, his blood alcohol level was .016, he 
had methamphetamine in his blood, methamphetamine residue on a paper in his 
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pocket, and a glass pipe. R. 4. Defendant did not have a driver's license, and his 
vehicle was not insured. R. 4. 
On September 21,2010, Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of attempted 
possession of a controlled substance and one count of driving under the influence. 
R. 25-26. During the plea colloquy, Defendant acknowledged the possibility that the 
court might impose consecutive sentences. Tr. at 6. Following his guilty pleas, 
Defendant requested immediate sentencing. Tr. at 7. After hearing a brief 
statement from Defendant's counsel and the prosecutor, Tr. at 7-8, the court said to 
Defendant: "Okay, do you know this conduct's not going to be tolerated?" Tr. at 8. 
The court then ordered two consecutive sentences of 365 days in jail. Explaining the 
decision to order consecutive sentences, the Court stated: "I'm running those 
consecutive to one another, based upon your need for treatment and the offenses 
that have been committed, and the danger that they pose to the community." Tr. at 
8. In spite of these concerns, however, the court then suspended his sentences on 
the condition that he serve an additional 30 days in jail, Tr. at 8.1 
1
 Defendant had already served 80 days in jail at that point, meaning that he 
ended up serving 110 days in jail for these offenses. Tr. at 8. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by not considering 
all the statutory factors before ordering consecutive sentences. But Defendant does 
not identify a single factor that he thinks was not considered, and he points to 
nothing in the record that shows that any of the factors were not considered. As a 
result, his claim necessarily fails. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN 
IT ORDERED DEFENDANTS SENTENCES TO RUN 
CONSECUTIVELY 
A trial court's decision to order consecutive or concurrent sentences is 
governed by Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-401 (West 2004). Under section 76-3-
401(2), a court must "consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the 
number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant" when imposing consecutive sentences. 
Defendant claims that the court abused its discretion by not considering each 
of the statutory factors. Aplt. Br. 5-8. But Defendant does not identify any statutory 
factor that he claims was not considered. While he cites the "gravity and 
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circumstances of the offenses" and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant, he 
acknowledges that the trial court actually did consider each factor. Aplt. Br. 7-8. 
Rather than focusing on any particular factor, Defendant instead claims that 
the trial court failed to "consider any mitigating circumstances/' Aplt. Br. 7. 
Among others, he cites to his age and lack of criminal history. Aplt. Br. 8. But 
section 76-3-401(2) does not require a court to specifically consider a defendant's age 
or criminal history. Instead, it more generally requires a court to consider the 
"history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Id. 
In this context, Defendant's claim fails for lack of proof. In State v. Helms, 2002 
UT 12, Tf 11,40 P.3d 626, the supreme court held that "as a general rule 'this court 
upholds" a trial court's consecutive sentencing decision, even if the trial court 
"failed to make findings on the record whenever it would be reasonable to assume 
that the court actually made such findings.' " 
Helms identified two general exceptions to this rule. The first is when a 
statute or prior case requires a trial court to make particular finding. Id. But, as 
noted in Helms, no statute or prior case requires a trial court to enter findings about 
why it is imposing consecutive sentences. Id. at f^ 12. 
The second exception is when "an ambiguity of facts makes" it 
"unreasonable" to assume that the trial court had considered a particular fact in a 
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particular case. Id. at f 11. In State v. Galli, 967 R2d 930 (Utah 1998), for example, 
the "written record" contained "detailed explanations for the sentences" at issue, 
and that record affirmatively showed that the trial courts had "failed to give 
'adequate weight to certain mitigating circumstances/" Helms, 2002 UT 12, f^ 15. 
Contrary to Defendant's claim, this does not mean that trial courts must 
always enter findings on the record about potential "mitigating circumstances." 
Aplt. Br. 5, 7-8. To the contrary, Helms stressed that "the burden is on [the 
defendant] to show that the trial court did not properly consider all the factors" 
required by section 76-3-401(2), and appellate courts will not "assume that the trial 
court's silence, by itself, presupposes that the court did not consider the proper 
factors as required by law." Id. at \ \ 11-12. Thus, "absent a showing by defendant 
that the trial court failed to consider the appropriate factors," appellate courts will 
"defer to the trial court's judgment" and uphold the sentence. Id at f 15; accord State 
v. Valdez, 2008 UT App 329, t 8,194 P.3d 195 (a trial court does not need to "state to 
what extent it considered each of the statutory factors at the sentencing hearing"). 
Here, Defendant points to nothing in this record that shows that the trial court 
did not consider any of the statutory factors. Given this, this claim fails. 
Moreover, Utah appellate courts have repeatedly stressed that the trial courts 
retain discretion over this decision. See, e.g., Helms, 2002 UT 12, f 8. In such cases, 
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a trial court only abuses its discretion when "no reasonable [person] would take the 
view" taken by the trial court. State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, f 12,84 P.3d 854; 
see also State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188,192 (Utah 1990). 
Here, Defendant drove a car while he was both drunk and under the effects of 
methamphetamine. He did so without insurance or a license. And as a result of his 
impairment, he critically injured two innocent people. In spite of the severity of his 
crimes, Defendant was allowed to plead guilty to only two class A misdemeanors, 
with all but 110 days of his jail sentence being suspended. Given the egregiousness 
of his conduct and the leniency of his sentence, Defendant cannot show that no 
reasonable person would have ordered that the suspended prison sentences run 
consecutively. There was no abuse of discretion in this case, and Defendant's claim 
should accordingly be rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's sentence. 
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